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Abstract. The paper analyzes the case of Belgium to provide insight into the relationships among 
ethnic heterogeneity, voting participation and local economic growth. We find that heterogeneity, 
and external and internal mobility reduce immigrants’ voting participation, while we do not find 
support for the hypothesis that voting participation is related to local economic growth, with the 
exception of Flanders, which is the most ethnically homogeneous region of Belgium. This finding is 
interpreted as showing that an increase in ethnic heterogeneity prevails over other factors in 
determining local economic performance via a decline in social capital. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Tiebout’s (1956) model states that if a sufficient number of local communities exist to 
accommodate different types of preferences, individuals can move to the community whose local 
government best satisfies their set of preferences. To quote Oates (1969, pp. 957-958), “Tiebout’s 
world is one in which the consumer “shops” among different communities offering varying 
packages of local public services and selects as a residence the community which offers the tax-
expenditure program best suited to his tastes.”  
Innocenti and Rapallini (2011) provide laboratory evidence on Tiebout efficiency-enhancing 
by checking if local sorting and decentralization produce welfare gains. Their main result is that 
‘voting with feet’ increases efficiency if it is joined with voting with ballots. Only if local 
community members exercise the right to vote is the increase in individual welfare positively 
related to the number of moving decisions. According to these findings, voting participation is a 
necessary condition for the validity of Tiebout’s model.  
In fact, an increase in racial heterogeneity in local communities (Rhode and Strumpf, 2003) 
is associated with a decrease in voting participation in most democracies. In countries where voting 
rights have been extended to minorities and immigrants, they exhibit much lower rates of voting 
participation than natives (Cho, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Bevelander and 
Pendakur, 2011).  
To provide insight into this issue, this paper analyzes a case study. Despite the advantages of 
inter-regional comparisons, few studies have analyzed these relationships, which are very difficult 
to test. Immigrants to Belgium have had the right to vote in local elections since 2006. This partial 
extension makes it possible to check if political participation has had an impact on the economic 
growth of local communities. Our starting hypothesis is that voting may enhance the ties between 
immigrants and local communities, reduce internal mobility, increase social capital, and 
consequently increase economic growth.  
Ethnic heterogeneity is indeed acknowledged to have a greater impact on economic growth 
at the local than at the national level (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Putnam, 2007). Research on 
this topic has been characterized by two approaches proceeding “in a parallel way: one on cross 
country comparisons, and one on local communities” (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; p. 762). In the 
first strand, diversity has been analyzed across different dimensions (ethno-linguistic, religious, 
etc.) by comparing national economic performances (Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; La 
Porta et al. 1999, Bluedorn, 2001; Alesina et al. 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). At the 
local level, the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and economic growth has been analyzed 
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through the concept of social capital to assess the effect of immigration on labour markets and local 
welfare, and also on political participation, widely defined, which is the main focus of our analysis. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on local growth 
and immigrant political participation. The data set and methods are illustrated in Section 3. Section 
4 presents and discusses the statistical results. Section 5 concludes.   
2. Background literature 
2.1  ‘Voting with your feet’  
A common assumption in migration theory is that immigrants’ human capital is less 
location-specific than that of natives and this increases their probability of moving across local 
communities. Internal mobility flows depend on many factors, such as labour market efficiency, 
housing costs and social networks, producing different location choices for natives and immigrants. 
The latter are less likely to be house owners, are concentrated in ethnic communities, and are 
mainly motivated by job searching. Assuming that residential displacement is driven by economic 
factors, Sasser (2010) compares three factors determining domestic state-to-state migrations in the 
U.S. between 1977 and 2006: labour market conditions, per capita incomes, and housing 
affordability. On the basis of Internal Revenue Service data, Sasser (2010) shows that, even if all 
three indexes of economic well-being are significant determinants of migration, the magnitude of 
their impact is highly variable and changes over time. Per capita income is decreasing in relevance, 
housing affordability is more and more relevant, while the condition of the labour market is the 
most prominent factor in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Closer to our work, a lively strand of literature, mostly concerning the U.S., compares the 
internal mobility of immigrants and natives to assess the impact on the labour market of native 
mobility in response to migrant inflows. Frey (1996) and Wright et al. (1997) come to different 
conclusions on the relationship between immigrant inflows and native outflows in U.S. 
metropolitan areas. The former find a strong positive correlation between the two flows, while the 
latter’s data analysis does not show any correlation. Borjas et al. (1997) report strong negative 
correlations between net native migration and immigration from abroad, while Card and DiNardo 
(2000) study the effect of the inflow of skill-group-specific immigrants on the location choices of 
the natives belonging to the same skill group. Their conclusion is that inflows of immigrants have 
quite significant impacts on the skill distributions of local communities, although they do not trigger 
rapid adjustments in the native population.  
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Empirical evidence for European countries is somewhat sparse. Hatton and Tani (2005) 
study internal migration across eleven British regions over two decades to understand if the effects 
of immigration on wages and/or unemployment are compensated by inter-regional labour mobility. 
They conclude that there is a displacement effect, especially for the southern regions, where 
immigration from abroad is concentrated. Moccetti and Porello (2010) and Brucker et al. (2011) 
study the displacement effect of immigrants in Italian local labour markets. In the first of these 
papers, a panel data analysis from 1995 to 2005 is performed to demonstrate that immigration is 
positively associated with inflows of highly-educated natives, suggesting the existence of potential 
complementarities. Moreover, the authors show how the displacement of poorly-educated natives 
has partially substituted the traditional south-north mobility of less-skilled natives. The main 
finding of Brucker et al. (2011) is that, conditional on unemployment and wage differentials, the 
presence of foreign workers in the labour force of the destination regions discourages internal 
labour mobility. Significantly enough, their conclusion is that spatial correlation studies, which use 
variation in the proportion of foreigners across regions to identify the effect of immigration on 
wages and levels of employment, tend to understate the actual impact of foreign immigration. De 
Valk and Willaert (2012) analyze the internal mobility of migrants in Belgium to test whether 
different migrant groups have different patterns and if the perceived neighbourhood characteristics 
are relevant to mobility decisions. They find that patterns of mobility and casual factors, mainly 
socio-economic ones, are similar for all the origin groups in Belgium. The use of census data allows 
them to draw conclusions about the displacement decisions of groups defined by ages and 
generation of immigration. For example, young adults of the second generation show similar 
patterns to young native adults, and people from northern European countries or from the U.S. are 
more similar in their displacement decisions to natives than other immigrant groups.    
A very recent strand of literature focuses on the role of ethnic groups as networks to provide 
information about jobs. In this perspective, in ethnic enclaves, which usually have higher 
employment rates, minorities may be disadvantaged in the job search process, but at the same time 
members of ethnic enclaves more easily share information on new job opportunities. These labour 
market mechanisms are thoroughly analyzed for the U.S. (Falcon and Melendez, 2001; Elliott, 
2001; Conley and Topa, 2002; Mouw, 2002; Munshi, 2003) and there are also some studies for 
European countries. Boman (2010) compares the internal mobility of natives and immigrants in 
Sweden in the late 80s in order to disentangle two effects: on the one hand non-natives are more 
likely to migrate to search for a job because they are endowed with less location-specific human 
capital; on the other hand immigrants tend to cluster in ethnic enclaves. The exercise shows that the 
migration propensity of the foreign-born is not significantly different from that of native Swedes, 
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although an extended model reveals a significant locking-in effect of enclaves on non-Nordic 
immigrants and a strong negative effect of living in a city. That is to say, when controlling for these 
additional effects, immigrants are more mobile than native Swedes. Frijters et al. (2005) and Battu 
et al. (2011) provide evidence for the UK that personal networks are the commonest method used 
by minorities to find a job, even if it is not the most effective. By using individual-level data from 
the UK Labour Force Survey, Patacchini and Zenou (2012) show that the higher the percentage of a 
given ethnic group living nearby, the higher the probability of finding a job through social contacts, 
but this effect decays very rapidly with distance. In contrast, Boeri et al. (2011) find that in Italy 
migrants who are resident in areas with high concentrations of non-natives are less likely to be 
employed compared to migrants resident in less segregated areas. By taking into account ethnic 
identity, Bisin et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between ethnic identity and employment for 
immigrants moving to Europe from non-European countries and find that immigrants with strong 
ethnic identity have more difficulties in finding a job, even if large differences emerge not only 
between first and second generation immigrants but also across countries.    
Finally, the impact that social capital has on job searching is discussed by David et al. 
(2010), who analyze the relations among local social capital, geographical mobility and labour 
market efficiency in a cross countries analysis, without separating immigrants from natives. They 
compare northern and southern European countries in terms of family and friendship ties and claim 
that an accumulation of local social capital reduces the mobility of workers and increases 
unemployment rates. According to the authors, this is a key finding for policy implications: “Local 
social capital may indeed act as a bottleneck, preventing mobility. Attempts to handle 
unemployment by changing labour market institutions may fail given [a] vicious circle involving 
immobility and high local social capital. Deregulating labour markets may simply increase 
inequality, but will not necessarily increase mobility a great deal.” (David et al., 2010; p. 201) 
 
2.2 Voting with ballots  
How enclaves work in immigrant integration in the host society is a key issue, not only for 
labour economics but also for political participation. In a seminal paper, Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000) investigate whether population heterogeneity, in terms of both income and ethnicity, 
influences the degree of participation in U.S. local communities. They define participation as a set 
of social activities and they show that engagement in these activities is weaker in communities 
where income inequalities and ethnic fragmentation are greater. The factors explaining political 
participation in heterogeneous societies are studied by Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006), using a 
data set in which macro data for 44 countries are analyzed together with individual-level data from 
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surveys collected as part of the World Values Surveys (WVS) in 1999–2001. The data set allows 
them to show the difference between ethnic heterogeneity and linguistic heterogeneity in differently 
explaining the multiple aspects of political participation, such as political discussion, membership, 
trust and political interest. Voting tornout is considered one of the many possible ways of 
participating and “studies that include an analysis of the voting behaviour of immigrants and their 
descendants are far less frequent in part because of lack of data and in part because immigrants are 
generally not given voting privileges until after attaining citizenship” (Bevelander and Pendakur, 
2011, p. 72).  Costa and Khan (2003) give evidence that in the U.S. the likelihood of voting is 
higher where heterogeneity is lower, while Campbell (2006) shows that voting participation 
increases both in homogeneous and in heterogeneous communities. In the first case, civic 
engagement drives the desire to vote, while in the second the key driving force is political 
motivation. In other words, in homogenous communities people decide to vote because of a shared 
social norm, while in heterogeneous contexts voters try to influence the result of an election. Both 
papers focus on the homogeneity/heterogeneity of the communities, but no distinction is made 
between the political participation of immigrants and natives. Extension of the traditional model of 
voting participation to immigrants needs to take into account not only the institutional barriers to 
registering and voting and the role of social networks, but also the role of personal characteristics 
(see Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). Among these features, some influence both native and 
immigrant propensities to vote, such as, for example, age, socio-economic status, level of education 
and the history of voting participation in each State; while there are others, such as language 
proficiency, residential mobility, the generation of immigration and years spent in the host country, 
that are specific for immigrants. Taking all these characteristics into account, Ramakrishnan and 
Espenshade (2001) do not find any statistical significance for an impact of the proximity of co-
ethnics on U.S. voting participation. They give an interesting twofold explanation of this result: on 
the one hand, the poverty of some of the communities with the highest concentrations of immigrants 
may be the main cause of the low level of voting participation; on the other hand, in these local 
communities immigrants without citizenship are probably more present than in others. Cho (1999) 
shows not only that different ethnic groups have different voting turnouts in US elections, but also 
that the generation of immigration and language proficiency affect groups’ voting participation 
differently. Bevelander and Pedankur (2011) demonstrate that being a Swedish citizen increases the 
voting participation of immigrants, even though the right to vote in local elections in Sweden has 
been accorded to non-citizen immigrants since 1975. With the aim of studying the effect of ethnic 
enclaves on the political participation of immigrants, Bilodeau (2009) tests the following alternative 
hypotheses: (a) immigrants in ethnic enclaves participate more because they are better socialized – 
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it is easier for political parties to reach them, they feel the “strength of numbers”, or (b) immigrants 
in ethnic enclaves participate less because they feel far from the host society. The evidence 
collected shows that immigrants participate more actively when living in federal constituencies with 
high concentrations of immigrants, and the impact of residential segregation is greater for 
immigrants from non-English-speaking countries.?
In countries where immigrants have the right to vote, they normally bear the burden of 
taxation and enjoy entitlement to social benefits. In this situation, one may ask what the 
consequences of different policies are on immigrant internal mobility and on the public budget. This 
question has been addressed in a Tiebout framework by distinguishing between native and 
immigrant voters. Michel et al. (1998) theoretically analyze the consequences of two different 
assimilation policies in a general equilibrium model in which only fully-fledged citizens benefit 
from redistribution and participate in the political process. Under the first policy, a migrant becomes 
a citizen right away, while in the second he takes a period of time to acquire citizenship. The model 
concludes that in small and open economies, such as local communities, with immediate 
assimilation, there is no redistribution effect regardless of the planning horizon of the government, 
while the contrary is true with deferred assimilation. This theoretical approach is related to the 
empirical literature on the impact of immigration on preferences for redistribution at the local level. 
In this work, the research question concerns the influence of groups of voters, natives and 
immigrants, on local public choice. In a paper on Spanish local communities, Monseny et al. (2011) 
provide support for the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity reduces income redistribution and the 
percentage of the municipal budget allocated to welfare. They also find a positive impact of 
immigrant density on voting share accruing to right-wing parties. Dahlberg et al. (2011) investigate 
the causal link between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution by exploiting an 
exogenous variation in immigrant shares stemming from a nationwide programme placing refugees 
in municipalities throughout Sweden during the period 1985-1994. They match data on refugee 
placement with panel survey data on inhabitants in the hosting municipalities and find significant 
negative effects of the increase in immigration on financial support for redistributive policies. By 
analyzing the same nationwide programme for refugees in Sweden as a natural experiment, Aslund 
(2005) is able to disentangle three different factors which influence residential decisions among 
immigrants: the presence of people from one’s country of birth; labour market prospects; and the 
availability of local public services. Specifically, the paper analyzes the decisions of immigrants in 
their initial and subsequent location choices by showing that they are attracted by regions where the 
number of welfare recipients is relatively high.  
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While surveys and field experiments are useful tools to test specific hypotheses, our paper 
focuses on census data to provide new evidence on the different patterns of migrant mobility in 
Belgium. In this way, the analysis of data on local communities and ethnic groups can help to 
disentangle the relationships among ethnic composition, voting participation and local economic 
growth. 
 
3 Data sets and methods 
 
3.1 Why Belgium? 
In Belgium non-European immigrants have the right to vote for local government but they 
are not allowed to vote in regional or national elections. Only immigrants who have been 
permanently resident for at least five years are eligible to vote upon registration.  
Belgium is one of the fifteen European countries
1
 where non-national residents are entitled 
to vote in local elections. In six of these countries this right is also accorded for the regional and 
national representative bodies.
2
 We decide to exclude these countries because when the exercise of 
voting is extended to all the levels of government, the decision to vote in municipal elections is part 
of a more complex process. Besides, in four European countries
3
 non-nationals cannot stand as 
candidates in local elections. Belgium in one of the three countries, together with Luxembourg and 
Slovenia, in which non-national residents are entitled to vote only in local elections and where they 
cannot stand as candidates in local elections.  
Belgium is divided into three main Regions – Brussels-Capital Region (Brussels), the 
Walloon Region (Wallonia) and the Flemish region (Flanders), 11 provinces, 43 districts and 589 
municipalities (Table 1).  
Brussels is the smallest of the three regions but it is the most densely populated. Its 
population increased by 8.7 per cent in the period 2000-2007 due to a large inflow of immigrants of 
foreign European origin, which account for 50.1 per cent of the total foreign population (Table 2). 
The immigrant population is markedly heterogeneous, as shown by the index of fractionalization of 
0.18 (Table 3). If we consider the top ten nationalities, their share of the total number of foreigners 
is 71.9 per cent, while the percentage of the first largest nationality out of the total number of 
foreigners is 16.7 per cent (Table 4). In the last decade, the Brussels Region was highly attractive to 
immigrants, as shown by the increase in the migration rate from 43.1 per cent (2000) to 80.04 per 
                                                            
1 Together with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
2 Denmark, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3 Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovenia. 
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cent (2009), which was associated with a lower internal mobility, which declined from -3.63 per 
cent (2000) to -9.53 per cent (2009) (Table 5). Brussels’ economy is characterized by a level of 
income significantly lower than the other regions (Table 3) and a marked specialization in the 
service sector.  
Flanders accounts for 58 per cent of the total Belgian population. In the period 2001-2009, 
the growth of the foreign population was 26.1 per cent (Table 2), but the share of this on the native 
population (5.4 per cent) (Table 2) and heterogeneity (0.02) (Table 3) were lower than in the other 
regions. The latter figure is due to the region’s large share of the first foreign nationality, which 
accounts for nearly 30 per cent of the total. The Flemish Region is highly attractive to immigrants. 
In the period 2000-2009, the migration rate from abroad increased from 46.9 per cent to 74.7 per 
cent and the internal migration rate from 2.21 per cent to 7.17 per cent (Table 5). The average 
income was the highest (13,730 Euros per year) among the country’s regions, as was the rate of 
economic growth (Table 4).  
Finally, Wallonia hosts 32.6 per cent of the total population, with a share of non-European 
foreign population equal to 9.2 per cent (Table 2). In the period 2000-2007 it recorded the lowest 
increase in the foreign population (1.3 per cent). The share of foreigners on the native population 
was slightly higher than in Flanders (9.2 per cent) (Table 2) and the heterogeneity of the population 
was approximately the same (0.02) (Table 3). The proportion of the most numerous foreign 
nationalities out of the total number of foreigners was 41.69 per cent and that of the top 10 
nationalities 84.96 per cent (Table 4). Compared with Brussels and Flanders, Wallonia attracts a 
lower number of immigrants from outside the country and more internal ones (Table 5). The 
average income is higher than in Brussels and lower than in Flanders, as is the economic growth 
rate. Until the 70s, Wallonia was the main engine of the Belgian economy, but it suffered from the 
crisis that affected the steel industry in the following two decades. 
 
3.2 Data set
Our data set collects various sources of information at the municipal level for all the 
municipalities of Belgium (N=589) for the period 2000-2007. First, we collected data from the 
National Institute of Statistics (INS) on the number of residents by nationality and municipality and 
their displacements between municipalities. Second, we used data from the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance of the Belgian Federal Government on average income levels declared for personal 
income tax. Finally, the Direction Génerale Institutions and Population releases data about non-
nationals (both European and non-European) resident in Belgium for more than five years, who are 
potential voters in local elections, and about those who signed up to vote. In our analysis we 
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consider the foreigners who registered as voters because, according to Belgian law, voting is 
mandatory once registered.  
3.3 Research hypothesis and methods  
 
Our data analysis is in two parts. First, we test whether economic growth is related to 
population heterogeneity by checking for internal and external mobility. Second, we include the 
relationship between political participation and economic growth in our analysis.  
 
More precisely, in the first step of the analysis our research hypotheses are the following: (1) 
fractionalization reduces local social capital and accordingly local growth; (2) external mobility 
increases fractionalization, and by reducing local social capital it is expected to have a negative 
effect on local growth; (3) the effect of internal mobility on the fractionalization,  on the social 
capital and local growth is uncertain because it depends on which factors drive internal mobility, i.e. 
local economic resources or the presence of ethnic networks. If the first prevail, internal mobility 
increases fractionalization and thus reduces growth, while if the second prevail internal mobility 
reduces local heterogeneity and increases local growth.  In our analysis the initial level of income is 
assumed to be positively related not only to internal mobility, but also to local growth.  
In the second step of the analysis, when political participation is considered, a further 
research hypothesis has to be verified, i.e. (4) how fractionalization influences political 
participation. As underlined in Section 2.2, the sign of this relation may be debatable, even if it is 
generally expected to be negative. On the one hand, internal mobility is expected to reduce 
participation, not only because residential stability is a prerequisite for civic engagement and thus 
for voting participation, but also because in a Tiebout framework ‘voting with your feet’ is 
considered an alternative to voting with ballots. On the other hand, there are multiple factors that 
influence the political participation of immigrants in both directions. Individual socio-economic 
status and the history of voting participation in each local community may both influence the 
turnouts of natives and immigrants (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). The generation of 
immigration, the years spent in the host county, language proficiency and ethnic networks are 
relevant for immigrant voters (Cho, 1999). Our data do not allow us to take into account all these 
personal characteristics and thus we are only able to verify the sign of the relation. On the contrary, 
the initial income level is expected to positively influence the political participation of both natives 
and immigrants. 
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We use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation in two specifications based on two different 
structural equation models.  
Model 1 is specified as follows:  
 
 !"#$%&'() *+ *, - ./0!"123%45)66 - .7*8$93) - .:**12';<=) - .>*5?';<=) - @), 
 
where the dependent variables represent the log of growth in local community i over the 
chosen period, logINCOMEi00 is the log of average income per capita in local community i in the 
initial year of the period, FRACi represents the average ethnic heterogeneity of the population in 
community i, INT_MOBi the average percentage of net new entry of immigrants from other 
municipalities of Belgium in local community i, and EXT_MOBi the average percentage of net new 
entry of immigrants from other countries in local community i . INCOME is the average taxable 
income per capita from 2000 to 2007 as recorded at municipality level, and the growth rate is 
calculated as the one-period growth rate (a) and the geometric average growth rate from 2000 to 
2007 (b), which are defined as follows: 
 
$AAB/ *C + DE***FGBFGHI*FG JK L MNN**     (a) 
$O*C + P* Q FGFGHI
GHI *R MS L MNN         (b). 
 
FRAC is the widely used “fractionalization index” (also called the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index) calculated at the municipal level. The index reflects the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals from a population belong to different groups: 
 
FRAC= M RT UV7WVX/ , 
 
where si is the share of group i (i=1…N) out of the total of the population. Immigrants are classified 
according to the continent of origin (Africa, Asia, UE Europe, Extra-UE Europe, the Americas, 
Oceania). INT_MOB represents the internal mobility of immigrants, which is the percentage of net 
new entry of immigrants from other Belgian municipalities, while EXT_MOB is the external 
mobility of immigrants to other countries. Both variables are defined as the percentage of net new 
entry as follows: 
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The second specification (Model 2) of the OLS estimation takes into account political 
participation. The structural equation model is defined as follows:  
 
 !"#$%&'() *+ *, - ./0!"123%45)66 - .7*8$93) - .:**12'Y4%Z) - .>*5?'Y4%Z) -
*.i*j9$'131j9'1%2` - @),   
 
in which the variable PARTICIPATIONi is the rate of political participation of immigrants in local 
elections in 2006. 
In order to assess causal relationships, we estimate two different specifications for each of 
the two models.  
The two versions of Model 1 assume two dependent variables, the growth rate and the 
FRAC index (Figure 1). In the first specification, Model 1.A, the growth rate (LOG_GROWTH) is 
explained by the level of income in 2000 (LOG_INCOME_00), population heterogeneity (FRAC) 
and two indexes of mobility, internal (INT_MOB2) and external (EXT_MOB2), which are also 
assumed to affect local population heterogeneity. In the second specification, Model 1.B, external 
mobility is still directly linked to population heterogeneity, but internal mobility only influences the 
growth rate. Accordingly, mobility from abroad only affects the fractionalization index.  
Model 2.A (Figure 2) includes political participation, which is assumed to be dependent on 
the initial average income of the municipality (LOG_INCOME_00), population heterogeneity 
(FRAC), and internal (INT_MOB2) and external mobility (EXT_MOB2). Economic growth 
(LOG_GROWTH) is affected by all the factors, i.e. internal and external mobility, heterogeneity, 
income and political participation. In contrast, Model 2.B excludes any effect of internal mobility 
on population heterogeneity and political participation.     
4. Results and interpretation 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the OLS estimation of Model 1, which confirm our hypothesis 
(1) that local economic growth is negatively related to ethnic heterogeneity for the set of all 
municipalities. Local growth also decreases if mobility is higher, both internal and external, 
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although the statistical significance of the coefficient on external mobility is greater than that on 
internal mobility. Estimations on the regions show that the two coefficients related to external 
mobility are significant for Flanders and Wallonia, but not for the Brussels region, which is, 
however, characterized by a value of internal mobility much greater than external mobility.  
The estimates of Model 1.A are shown in Table 7. As expected, local growth is reduced by 
external mobility and heterogeneity (hypothesis 1 and 2). In particular, if a municipality with low 
income attracts immigrants, from abroad and other municipalities, the increase in population 
heterogeneity reduces the growth of local income. Internal mobility and heterogeneity are found to 
be positively related, although the relation is not statistically significant. This finding confirms that 
the effect of internal mobility on heterogeneity is uncertain. As discussed before, if two main 
drivers of internal mobility are assumed, i.e. local economic resources and ethnic networks, and the 
former prevail, the final result of the internal mobility is an increase in heterogeneity.   
Model 1.B (Table 8), which assumes that internal mobility directly affects only the growth 
rate, confirms the negative and statistically significant impact of external mobility and population 
heterogeneity on local economic growth (hypothesis 1 and 2), while it shows a negative but not 
statistically significant relation between internal mobility and local growth (hypothesis 3). Like 
model 1.A, model 1.B shows an unexpected negative influence of the initial level of income on 
local growth. 
The model specification, i.e. the path diagram of the final model in Figure 1B, is also 
verified and fit indices exceed minimum thresholds of adaptation, revealing a good fit of the model 
with the population. In particular, the Chi-square test is not statistically significant (  ² (4) = 9.178, 
p <0.057) and the other indices considered are satisfactory (RMSEA =0.047; CFI =0.990; NNFI 
=0.983)4.  
Thus, the first part of our analysis supports the hypothesis that both heterogeneity and 
external mobility have a negative impact on economic growth.  
The OLS estimation of Model 2 is shown in Table 9. The sign of the coefficient of the 
variable PARTICIPATION is positive and significant for the Flemish region, in which the higher 
local political participation is, the higher the growth rate is. In contrast, it is negative and significant 
for all the municipalities and Wallonia. Although the correlations are statistically significant and 
coherent with our hypothesis, i.e. political participation is negatively correlated with mobility and 
heterogeneity is positively correlated with growth, the coefficients are significant but with the 
expected sign only for Flanders.  
                                                            
4 See Loehlin (2004) and Byrne (2001) 
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By taking into account political participation, Model 2.A shows an unexpected result, i.e. 
that political participation is negatively influenced by the initial level of income (Table 10). 
However, negative relationships between both local heterogeneity and external mobility and 
political participation are confirmed. The only variable that positively affects political participation 
is internal mobility but the relationship is not significant. This finding does not support our 
hypothesis that voting with ballots is considered an alternative to internal mobility by immigrants, 
while all the other relationships are consistent with our interpretation.  
According to Model 2.B (Table 11), political participation is greater if heterogeneity, 
external mobility and initial income are lower. As discussed in Section 2.2. the negative relation 
between the initial level of income and participation was not expected. Moreover, the lower 
population heterogeneity and external mobility are, the higher local growth is, although the 
relationship between political participation and the growth rate is not statistically significant. 
Similarly to model 1.B, post-estimation tests show a good fit of the model assumed with the 
population (RMSEA=0.043; CFI=0.992; NNFI=0.984), although the Chi-Square tests are not 
statistically significant ( ²(5)=10.272, p<0.068). 
To summarize, the second part of the analysis supports our hypothesis that political 
participation and local growth are directly related only for the Flemish region, but not for Belgium 
as a whole or for Wallonia and Brussels. The estimations of the models provide robust evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that both heterogeneity and external mobility have a negative impact on 
economic growth. Contrary to the starting hypotheses, local economic growth is negatively related 
to political participation. One of the possible reasons for this result is the unexpected negative 
influence of the initial level of income on local growth and political participation.   
We also find that the growing population of immigrants coming from abroad, which 
increases the heterogeneity of local communities as measured by the fractionalization index, has a 
negative effect on political participation. The estimates of two specifications of the tested models 
corroborate our findings.  
 Although we expected that low internal mobility would be positively related to high 
political participation, high social capital and local economic growth, we did not have any starting 
hypothesis on the effect of internal mobility on fractionalization. This explains the choice to test the 
structural models in the two versions, A and B, where the latter assumes that internal mobility only 
affects growth and not fractionalization. The B Models provide better fits than the A Models. This 
is because internal mobility is not statistically significant in explaining fractionalization. Besides, 
internal mobility is not significant in explaining political participation. This last finding means that 
voting with ballots is not considered by immigrants an alternative to internal mobility.  
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Finally, the data analysis supports the theory that voting participation per se does not suffice 
to increase local economic growth. This interpretation is corroborated by the contrasting finding of 
a direct relationship between voting participation and growth in the Flemish region, which is the 
least ethnically heterogeneous region of Belgium. 
From this evidence, we suppose that among the factors affecting economic growth the effect 
of ethnic heterogeneity on economic growth appears to be the most relevant at the local level 
through the decline in local social capital. This factor appears to prevail over one of the most 
important components of political participation, which is immigrants’ voting participation.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analyzed the case of Belgium to provide insight into the relationships among 
ethnic heterogeneity, political participation and local economic growth. In Belgium, immigrants 
have the right to vote only in local elections. This feature of the Belgian political system allows 
investigation into whether immigrant political participation is related to local economic growth. 
Our data analysis provides evidence that ethnic heterogeneity, and internal and external 
mobility are negatively related to voting participation, while it does not provide support for the 
hypothesis that immigrant voting participation is related to local economic growth.  The only region 
in which the two variables are directly related is Flanders, which is the most ethnically 
homogeneous region of Belgium. This finding may be interpreted as showing that an increase in 
ethnic heterogeneity prevails over other factors in determining local economic performance via 
declining levels of social capital. Analysis of the relationships between ethnicity, voting and 
economic development is indeed made complex by the multi-dimensional definition of ethnic 
identity, which depends on a variety of factors such as gender, language, origin and religion. In 
particular, immigrant voting participation might probably be boosted by an increase in immigrants’ 
socioeconomic status. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Model specifications 1.A and 1.B 
 1A  1B 
 
Figure 2. Model specifications 2.A and 2.B 
2A     2B 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Levels of government in Belgium 
Table 2. Population by Regions 
Regions Provinces Districts Municipalities
Brussels Region 1 19
Flemish Region 22 308
Anvers 3 70
Limburg 3 44
East Flanders 6 65
Flemish Brabant 2 65
West Flanders 8 64
Walloon Region 20 262
Brant Walloon 1 27
Hainaut 7 69
Liege 4 75
Including German!speaking Community 9
Luxembourg 5 44
Namur 3 38
Belgium 43 589
Regions
Total population (% per 
Region) 
Total population 
(Var % 00!07) 
Density of 
population per 
KM2 in 2007
Foreign 
population 
(Var% 00!07)
Brussels Region 9.4 8.7 6496 12.3
Walloon Region 32.6 3.3 205 1.3
Flemish Region 58.0 3.5 455 26.1
Belgium 100.0 3.9 349.0 12.7
Regions
Incidence of foreign 
population in 2007
Incidence of 
foreigners on total 
pop. (Var% 00!07)
Percentage of 
European foreign 
(average 00!07) 
Percentage of 
non European 
foreigners 
( 00 07)
Incidence of the 
first foreign 
nationality 
( 00 07)
Brussels Region 27.6 3.3 49.9 50.1 16.7
Walloon Region 9.2 !1.9 69.6 30.4 41.7
Flemish Region 5.4 21.8 54.4 45.6 30.1
Belgium 8.8 8.5 58.4 41.6 20.5
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics (average values for the period 2000-2007) 
 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max
All Municipalities (N=589)
Income (€ per capita) 12967.24 1777.93 6841.68 18970.04
Log income 4.11 .06 3.84 4.28
Log income  i=2000
4.03 .07 3.72 4.21
Growth 37.50 14.01 13.51 181.93
Log growth 1.56 .12 1.13 2.26
Growth rate 4.60 1.30 1.83 15.96
Log growth rate .65 .10 .26 1.20
Frac .02 .04 .00 .39
Internal mobility  2.35 29.20  302.41 49.98
External mobility 52.48 20.45  26.04 92.31
Brussels Region (N=19)
Income (€ per capita) 11638.73 2345.67 6841.68 15024.86
Log income 4.06 .09 3.84 4.18
Log income  i=2000
4.01 .10 3.76 4.12
Growth 23.82 5.50 17.82 40.05
Log growth 1.37 .09 1.25 1.60
Growth rate 3.09 .64 2.37 4.93
Log growth rate .48 .08 .37 .69
Frac .18 .08 .08 .39
Internal mobility  2.50 22.16  54.22 33.36
External mobility 68.55 20.82 25.41 92.31
Flemish Region (N=308)
Income (€ per capita) 13730.04 1568.25 9698.65 18970.04
Log income 4.13 .05 3.99 4.28
Log income  i=2000
4.06 .06 3.90 4.21
Growth 35.06 6.69 17.53 63.82
Log growth 1.54 .08 1.24 1.80
Growth rate 4.37 .73 2.33 7.31
Log growth rate .63 .07 .37 .86
Frac .02 .02 .00 .14
Internal mobility  3.98 32.74  302.41 49.98
External mobility 56.09 20.55  26.04 90.43
Walloon Region (N=262)
Income (€ per capita) 12166.85 1546.24 9009.03 18243.21
Log income 4.08 .05 3.95 4.26
Log income  i=2000
4.00 .07 3.72 4.20
Growth 41.35 18.76 13.51 181.93
Log growth 1.59 .13 1.13 2.26
Growth rate 4.98 1.66 1.83 15.96
Log growth rate .68 .11 .26 1.20
Frac .02 .02 .00 .14
Internal mobility  .43 24.87  147.14 46.59
External mobility 47.06 18.75  11.70 87.02
!22!
!
Table 4. Share of the first and the top ten nationalities on total foreign population 
 
 
Table 5. Migration rates  
 
 
Regions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 on average
Brussels Region 20.92 18.33 16.62 15.94 15.61 15.24 15.42 15.59 16.71
Walloon Region 44.84 44.44 43.72 42.76 41.71 40.20 38.68 37.19 41.69
Flemish Region 27.51 29.31 30.06 30.58 30.98 30.87 31.03 30.66 30.13
Belgium 22.70 22.53 22.00 21.27 20.56 19.49 18.44 17.40 20.55
Regions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 on average 
Brussels Region 77.27 75.07 73.40 72.23 71.20 69.87 68.69 67.62 71.92
Walloon Region 87.70 86.94 86.29 85.61 85.10 83.77 82.59 81.68 84.96
Flemish Region 80.54 78.70 77.19 76.01 75.07 73.11 71.83 70.44 75.36
Belgium 82.03 80.35 79.05 78.02 77.16 75.35 74.17 72.97 77.39
Share of the first nationality on total foreign population, per year and on average
Share of the top ten  nationalities on total foreign population, per year and on average
Immigration rate from abroad
Regions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Brussels Region 43.13 58.17 64.18 58.36 62.63 67.20 67.18 73.12 88.02 80.04
Wallon Region 20.80 26.54 29.80 32.12 35.02 36.74 39.56 43.40 42.40 42.50
Flemish Region 46.88 64.60 73.50 70.84 70.70 72.20 77.87 87.26 88.97 74.75
Belgium 36.13 48.61 54.66 53.04 55.52 58.25 61.46 68.24 73.50 66.16
Internal migration rate 
Regions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Brussels Region  3.63  5.40  5.95  6.67  8.82  8.70  10.06  9.60  9.71  9.53
Wallon Region 1.04 1.22 1.14 1.92 2.15 2.95 2.59 1.83 .08 .77
Flemish Region 2.21 3.70 4.29 4.06 5.70 4.67 6.16 6.39 7.95 7.17
Belgium .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
!23!
!
Table 6. Model 1 OLS Estimation (Log Growth, independent variable)  
Table 7. Regression Weights - Model 1A 
 
Table 8. Regression Weights - Model 1B 
Dependent Variable All Municipalities Brussels Region Flemish Region Walloon Region 
Constant 5.035 3.483 4.488 5.697
(29.09)*** !1.11 (16.971)*** (18.67)***
LOG INCOME00
 .584  .515  .478  .650
(!19.78)*** (!0.66) (!10.89)*** (!13.37)***
FRAC  .417  .406  .343  .230
(!14.29)*** (!0.54) (!7.98)*** (!5.05)***
INT_MOB  .058  .699  .042  .015
(!1.98)* (!1.56) (!0.96) (!0.305)
EXT_MOB  .173  .261  .248  .148
(!5.94)*** (!0.71) (!5.90)*** (!3.19)***
Adj. R
2
0.53 0.37 0.48 0.48
OBS 582 19 307 256
Notes:!1)!Robust!t statistics !are!reported!in!parentheses;!2)*!denotes!statistical!significance!at!the!10%!level,!**!!5%!level,!***!the!1%!level
Estimate S.E. C.R. P.
Standardized 
Estimate
Research hypothesis 
and expected signs 
FRAC INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 0.661 0.509 0.027 (3)/?
FRAC EXT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 5.581 *** 0.225 (2)/+
LOG_GROWTH LOG_INCOME_00  0.846 0.042  19.975 *** !0.566 +
LOG_GROWTH FRAC  1.108 0.077  14.418 *** !0.404 (4)/ 
LOG_GROWTH INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000  1.999 0.046 !0.057 ?
LOG_GROWTH EXT_MOB2  0.001 0.000  5.978 ***  0.167 (2)/ 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P.
Standardized 
Estimate
Research hypothesis 
and expected signs 
FRAC EXT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 5.543 *** 0.224 (2)/+
LOG_GROWTH LOG_INCOME_00  0.846 0.042  19.975 *** !0.567 +
LOG_GROWTH FRAC  1.108 0.077  14.424 *** !0.405 (4)/ 
LOG_GROWTH INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000  2.000 0.046 !0.057 ?
LOG_GROWTH EXT_MOB2  0.001 0.000  5.980 ***  0.168 (2)/ 
!24!
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Table 9. Model 2 OLS Estimation (Log Growth, independent variable)  
 
 
Table 10. Regression weights (Model 2.A) 
 
Table 11. Regression weights (Model 2.B) 
Dependent Variable All Municipalities Brussels Region Flemish Region Walloon Region 
Constant 5.196 .622 4.426 5.807
(27.75)*** !0.183 (16.76)*** (19.16)***
LOG!INCOMEI=00
 .609 .140  .470 !0.661
(!19.34)*** !0.171 (!10.76)*** (!13.75)***
FRAC  .427 .069  .340  .260
(!14.50)*** !0.09 (!17.97)*** (!5.65)***
INT_MOB  .056  .980  0.031  .019
(!1.89) (!2.16) (!0.709) (!0.39)
EXT_MOB  .186 .054  .236  .148
( 6.29)***  .130 ( 5.60)*** ( 3.24)**
PARTICIPATION  .069 .440 .095  .132
(!2.21)* !1.69 (!2.26)* (!2.88)**
Adj. R
2
0.53 0.44 0.48 O.50
OBS 582 19 307 73
Notes:!1)!Robust!t statistics!are!reported!in!parentheses;!2)*!denotes!statistical!significance!at!the!10%!level,!**!at!the!5%!level,!***!at!the!1%!level
Estimate S.E. C.R. P.
Standardized 
Estimate
Research hypothesis and 
expected signs 
FRAC EXT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 5.581 *** 0.225 (2)!/+
FRAC INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 0.661 0.509 0.027 (3)/?
PARTICIPATION! LOG_INCOME_00  0.659 0.072  9.210 *** !0.357 +
PARTICIPATION! FRAC  0.500 0.130  3.850 *** !0.148 (4)/ 
PARTICIPATION! EXT_MOB2  0.001 0.000  4.899 *** !0.188 (2)/ 
PARTICIPATION! INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 1.049 0.294 0.041  !(i f!a !Tiebout!framework!i s !veri fied)!
LOG_GROWTH LOG_INCOME_00  0.882 0.045  19.532 *** !0.590 +
LOG_GROWTH FRAC  1.136 0.078  14.649 *** !0.414 (1)!/ 
LOG_GROWTH EXT_MOB2  0.001 0.000  6.326 *** !0.180 (2)/ 
LOG_GROWTH PARTICIPATION!  0.054 0.024  2.225 0.026 !0.067 +
LOG_GROWTH INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000  1.909 0.056 !0.054 ?
Estimate S.E. C.R. P.
Standardized 
Estimate
Research hypothesis and 
expected signs 
FRAC EXT_MOB2 0.000 0.000 5.543 *** 0.224 (2)!/+
PARTICIPATION! LOG_INCOME_00  0.639 0.069  9.259 *** !0.346 +
PARTICIPATION! FRAC  0.493 0.130  3.791 *** !0.145 (4)! 
PARTICIPATION! EXT_MOB2  0.001 0.000  4.952 *** !0.190  
LOG_GROWTH LOG_INCOME_00  0.882 0.045  19.611 *** !0.592  
LOG_GROWTH FRAC  1.136 0.077  14.660 *** !0.415  
LOG_GROWTH EXT_MOB2  0.001 0.000  6.325 *** !0.181  
LOG_GROWTH PARTICIPATION!  0.054 0.024  2.227 0.026 !0.067 +
LOG_GROWTH INT_MOB2 0.000 0.000  1.911 0.056 !0.054 ?
